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Family Law. Giarrusso v. Giarrusso, 204 A.3d 1102 (R.I. 2019).
The Rhode Island Supreme Court affirmed the Family Court’s
decision and order enforcing a property settlement agreement that
the parties had agreed to as a part of their dissolution of marriage.1
FACTS AND TRAVEL
Plaintiff Diane Giarrusso (Diane) 2 and Defendant Paul
Giarrusso (Paul) divorced after twenty-three years of marriage.3
During their marriage, the parties acquired two dogs: a greyhound
named Marox and a Chihuahua named Winnie. 4 In October 2016,
the parties “entered into a Marital Settlement Agreement (MSA),
formalizing the terms of dissolution of their marriage.” 5 The MSA
awarded Diane “all right title and interest in and to” the two dogs,
but Paul was “permitted to take the dogs for visits from Tuesday
morning at 8 a.m. through Thursday morning at 8:00 a.m.” 6
From October 2016 until the end of March 2017, Diane abided
by the MSA, allowing Paul’s weekly visitation with the dogs. 7 By
the end of March 2017, however, “Diane unilaterally ceased
allowing the weekly visits.” 8 In May 2017, Paul filed a motion for
post-final judgment relief with the Providence County Family
Court.” 9 In his motion, Paul claimed that “Diane had denied his
visitation time with the dogs for several weeks.” 10 Paul asked the
1. Giarrusso v. Giarrusso, 204 A.3d 1102 (R.I. 2019).
2. Consistent with the Court’s opinion, Diane Giarrusso and Paul
Giarrusso are referred to by their first names.
3. Id. at 1104.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id. In January 2017, the Providence County Family Court entered a
final judgment officially dissolving the marriage. Id. The judgment
“incorporated the MSA without merging it.” Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
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Family Court to “enforce the MSA by ordering Diane to comply with
the visitation schedule, provide makeup visits for the weeks denied
to him, and award his attorney’s fees for his pursuit of the courtenforcement order.” 11 Diane opposed the motion and filed her own
motion for relief in July of 2017. 12 Diane looked “to enjoin and
restrain Paul from having any time with the dogs[,]” claiming that
“Paul had not properly cared for the dogs when they were with him
and had attempted to keep the dogs away from her, thereby
breaching the MSA.” 13
On December 4, 2017, a Family Court justice held a hearing
on the matter where both parties testified. 14 The hearing justice
also reviewed text messages and emails exchanged between the
parties, as well as veterinary bills and records. 15 In her testimony,
Diane gave examples of Paul’s alleged mistreatment of the dogs.16
Diane attested that “Marox returned from one visit with one of his
claws damaged, hanging and bleeding,” and that “Marox returned
from another visit with a ‘huge bubble on his lip.’” 17 After both
instances, Diane “took Marox to the vet.” 18 Paul, however, refuted
Diane’s allegations, arguing that “he heard about the damaged claw
for the first time while in court and that the bubble on Marox’s lip
had appeared while he was away for a two-week work-related
trip.” 19 Additionally, Paul pointed out that “the MSA gave Diane
complete control over the care of the dogs, such that he could not
take them to the vet or make any decisions about their care.” 20
Paul’s last visitation with the dogs occurred on March 29,
2017.21 That afternoon, Paul called Diane to tell her that “the dogs
were acting strangely and [that] Winnie was whimpering.” 22 When
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 1104–05.
16. Id. at 1105.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id. Through text messages, the parties “argued . . . whether Diane
would pick up only Winnie to take him to the vet or whether she would pick up
both dogs because, according to Diane, the dogs became anxious when they

644 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 25:642
Diane arrived at Paul’s residence, however, she received the
unfortunate news that Marox was nowhere to be found.23 Paul
testified that after his telephone conversation with Diane, “he had
let the dogs out to relieve themselves and he thought both dogs had
returned inside the house, but then he could not find Marox.” 24
Friends, family, and neighbors of the parties joined them in the
search for the greyhound. 25 After an hour and a half search, “Paul
found Marox, who had apparently been in his house the entire time,
stuck in a closet.” 26 Paul attested that he was distressed over
Marox’s disappearance and assured that the incident was not a
malicious attempt to upset Diane. 27
Following the incident on March 29, Paul attempted to visit the
dogs but stated that “Diane had not responded to his
communications.”28 In her own motion for relief, Diane asked the
hearing justice to “withdraw the court’s approval of the MSA
because, in light of the incidents described during the testimony,
the MSA provision allowing Paul weekly visitations was
inequitable.” 29 In response, Paul argued that “Diane had breached
the terms of the MSA, which she had effectively admitted when she
stated that she had not allowed him to see the dogs since March
29.” 30
After hearing both parties’ arguments, the hearing justice held
in favor of Paul. 31 The hearing justice found that the MSA
“unambiguously gave Paul the right to visitation with the dogs
every week from Tuesday to Thursday and did not provide for
splitting the costs of the care and maintenance of the dogs.” 32 The
were separated.” Id. The parties “eventually agreed that Diane would pick up
both dogs so she could take Winnie to the vet.” Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. “Diane testified that she ‘was so upset and hysterical’ during the
search effort that she ‘was puking on the side of the road.’” Id. Similarly, Paul
testified that he was emotional and crying “both before Diane arrived and
throughout the search for Marox.” Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 1106. The Court noted that, “[d]uring his testimony, Paul’s
distress about the litigation over the dogs was palpable.” Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
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hearing justice also noted how “Paul always acted in good faith with
respect to the dogs.” 33 Accordingly, the hearing justice ordered that
Paul “ha[ve] the dogs Tuesdays through Thursdays as provided in
[the MSA]” and awarded attorney’s fees to Paul in the amount of
$5,248.70. 34 Further, “[t]he hearing justice denied Diane’s request
relief.” 35 Diane timely appealed to the Rhode Island Supreme
Court (the Court).36
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
The Court sought to determine two issues: (1) whether the
hearing justice erred by not reforming the MSA and (2) whether the
hearing justice erred in finding that “there was no inequity in
enforcing [the terms of] the MSA as written.”37 The Court limned
the standard of review, stating that it “will not disturb findings of
fact made by a trial justice or magistrate in a divorce action unless
he or she has misconceived the relevant evidence or was otherwise
clearly wrong.” 38
The Court first rejected Diane’s argument that “the hearing
justice erred by not reforming the MSA.” 39 The Court pointed out
that a property settlement agreement is a contract for all legal
purposes. 40 Accordingly, the Court reiterated that before a contract
is subjected to judicial reformation, the court must first find a
mutual mistake between the parties. 41 The court defined a mutual
mistake as “one that is common to both parties wherein each labors
under a misconception respecting the same terms of the written

33. Id.
34. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. (quoting Bober v. Bober, 92 A.3d 152, 157 (R.I. 2014)).
39. Id. at 1107.
40. Id. “It is well settled that a property settlement agreement that has
been ‘incorporated by reference, but not merged into the final divorce decree,
retains the characteristics of a contract.’” Id. (quoting Esposito v. Esposito, 38
A.3d 1, 5 (R.I. 2012)). “Consequently, unless it is shown that the trial justice
either improperly exercised his or her discretion or that there was an abuse
thereof, [the] Court [said it] will not disturb the trial justice’s findings.” Id. at
1106 (quoting Palin v. Palin, 41 A.3d 248, 253 (R.I. 2012)).
41. Id. at 1107 (citing Esposito, 38 A.3d at 5).
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agreement sought to be reformed,” 42 and explained that “[w]hen a
mutual mistake is manifest in the agreement at the time it is
entered into, the agreement fails in a material respect correctly to
reflect the understanding of both parties.” 43
Here, the Court first recognized that the MSA is a contract and
that dogs are personal property. 44 The Court noted that the
hearing justice “explicitly found that Diane understood the contract
and concluded there was no mistake in the contract.” 45 As the
Court explained, “[b]oth parties testified that, at the time they
entered into the MSA, they intended for Diane to have all rights to
the dogs, with weekly visitation for Paul.” 46 Accordingly, the Court
held that there was “no mutual mistake in the MSA’s visitation
term and no indication that the hearing justice misconceived the
evidence when she concluded that the MSA need not be
reformed.” 47
The Court then addressed Diane’s argument that the MSA
was “inequitable” and that Paul “acted in bad faith.” 48 The Court
acknowledged “the Family Court’s important role in monitoring
property settlement agreements between spouses and ensuring an
equitable division of assets.” 49 The Court explained that while the
Family Court does have the authority to review and reform a
property settlement agreement if it determines that the agreement
is inequitable, “[i]t is not the function of [the Supreme] Court, or
the Family Court, to set aside a property settlement agreement
simply because a party no longer wishes to be bound by its terms or
is unhappy with the result.” 50 Consequently, the Court affirmed
the Family Court justice’s decision and order. 51 The Court held

42. Id. (quoting Esposito, 38 A.3d at 5).
43. Id. (quoting Esposito, 38 A.3d at 5).
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. (citing Bober v. Bober, 92 A.3d 152, 157 (R.I. 2014) and Gorman v.
Gorman, 883 A.2d 732, 740-41 (R.I. 2005)).
48. Id.
49. Id. (citing Gorman, 883 A.2d at 737).
50. Id. at 1108 (quoting O’Donnell v. O’Donnell, 79 A.3d 815, 822 (R.I.
2013)) (internal quotations omitted).
51. Id. “After reviewing the entire record in this case, [the Court found]
that the hearing justice’s findings and conclusions were well supported by the
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that “it is not inequitable to enforce the visitation term in the MSA
as written.” 52 The Court ordered Diane to comply with the MSA
and to pay $5248.70 in attorney’s fees.53
COMMENTARY
The Court found that the hearing justice did not err in (1) not
reforming the MSA and (2) not finding that the MSA was
inequitable. 54 In doing so, the Court emphasized how it is neither
the Court’s nor the Family Court’s function to tear up or reform a
contract simply because one of the parties is no longer content with
it. 55 Here, the Court is directly referring to Diane, who breached
the contract by not permitting Paul to see the dogs after March
29. 56 As a result of this breach, Diane must not only comply with
the MSA, but must also pay attorney’s fees in the amount of
$5248.70. 57
While the Court made it clear that Diane would not have been
able to get a judicial remedy for what she sought—retaining full
ownership of the dogs without any visitation arrangement—the
Court did indicate that it nevertheless might have reviewed her
objection to paying Paul’s attorney fees. 58 The Court concluded,
however, that any such argument was waived. 59 Even though
Diane “briefly mention[ed] that the hearing justice erred by
awarding attorney’s fees to Paul” during her pre-briefing
statement, Diane’s argument was waived because she failed to
preserve the issue when “she did not object to the court’s order
memorializing both the award and her consent thereto.” 60 Even if
Diane had objected to the court’s order of the award, however,
Diane nonetheless waived appellate review of the attorney’s fee
because she did not meaningfully discuss this argument, but rather
testimony and evidence before her and that she neither misconceived the
evidence nor was clearly wrong in her findings of fact.” Id.
52. Id.
53. See id. at 1106.
54. Id. at 1007–08.
55. Id. at 1008.
56. Id. at 1106.
57. See id. at 1007–08.
58. See id. at 1107 n.8.
59. Id.
60. Id.
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simply mentioned the issue in her pre-briefing statement. 61 Thus,
while the Court made it clear that Diane would not be able to have
exclusive rights to the dogs, the Court would have reviewed her
objection to paying Paul’s attorney fees if she had preserved the
issue below and argued the issue on appeal. 62
CONCLUSION
The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that the hearing justice
did not err when she did not reform the MSA and when she did not
find the MSA inequitable. 63 Pursuant to contract law, the Court
found that the Family Court did not err in enforcing the property
settlement agreement the parties had agreed upon as a part of their
dissolution of marriage. 64
Karen Lara

61. Id. (citing Terzian v. Lombardi, 180 A.3d 555, 558 (R.I. 2018)).
62. Id.
63. Id. at 1102.
64. Id.

